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Abstract—We consider the problem of achieving uniform node
sampling in large scale systems in presence of a strong adversary.
We first propose an omniscient strategy that processes on the
fly an unbounded and arbitrarily biased input stream made
of node identifiers exchanged within the system, and outputs
a stream that preserves Uniformity and Freshness properties.
We show through Markov chains analysis that both properties
hold despite any arbitrary bias introduced by the adversary.
We then propose a knowledge-free strategy and show through
extensive simulations that this strategy accurately approximates
the omniscient one. We also evaluate its resilience against a
strong adversary by studying two representative attacks (flooding
and targeted attacks). We quantify the minimum number of
identifiers that the adversary must insert in the input stream
to prevent uniformity. To our knowledge, such an analysis has
never been proposed before.
Index Terms—Data stream; strong adversary; uniform sam-
pling; Markov chains; randomized approximation algorithm.
I. INTRODUCTION
The uniform node sampling service offers to applications
using it a single simple primitive that returns the identifier of
a random node that belongs to the system. Providing at any
time randomly chosen nodes in the system has deserved a lot
of attention to construct large scale distributed applications. A
typical example is load balancing in cluster-based applications:
choosing a host at random among those that are available is
often a choice that provides performance close to that offered
by more complex selection criteria, without imposing any
burden [20]. Another important example is epidemic-based
applications: by periodically selecting few random nodes as
neighbors, large-scale environments preserve their connectivity
despite nodes dynamicity [5], [10], [22], [26].
Node sampling is a cooperative service in the sense that all
the nodes of the system contribute to this service by continu-
ously sending and forwarding information about their pres-
ence. Unfortunately, the unavoidable presence of malicious
nodes in large scale and open systems seriously impedes the
construction of uniform node sampling [14], [19], [25]. The
objective of malicious nodes mainly consists in continuously
and largely biasing the input data stream out of which samples
are obtained, to prevent (correct) nodes from being selected
as samples. Consequences of these collective attacks (typically
called Sybil attacks [11]) are, among others, the overwhelming
load of some specific nodes when it is used to provide random
locations for data caching or storage, or the eventual partition-
ing of the system when the node sampling service is used to
build nodes local views in epidemic-based protocols. Solutions
that basically consist in storing the identifier of all the nodes
of the system so that each of these node identifiers can be
randomly selected when needed are impracticable and even
infeasible due to the size and the dynamicity of such networks.
Rather providing a solution that requires as little space as
possible (e.g. sublinear in the population size of the system) is
definitely desirable. Bortnikov et al. [6] have recently proposed
a uniform node sampling algorithm that tolerates malicious
nodes by exploiting the properties offered by min-wise per-
mutations. Specifically, the sampling component, which is fed
with the stream of node identifiers periodically gossiped by
nodes, outputs the node identifier whose image value under
the randomly chosen permutation is the smallest value ever
encountered. Thus eventually, by the property of min-wise
permutation, the sampler converges towards a random sample.
However by the very same properties of min-wise permutation
functions, once the convergence has been reached, it is stuck
to this convergence value independently from any subsequent
input values. Thus the sample does not evolve according to the
current composition of the system, which makes it static. Ac-
tually it has been shown in [2] that imposing strict restrictions
on the number of messages sent by malicious nodes during
a given period of time and providing each correct node with
a very large memory (proportional to the size of the system)
is a necessary and sufficient condition to output an unbiased
and non static stream. Thus, lack of adaptivity or full-space
algorithms seem to be the only defenses against adversarial
behaviors when considering deterministic algorithms.
In this paper, we solve this problem by adopting a prob-
abilistic approach. We first propose an omniscient algorithm,
called in the following the omniscient strategy, that is capable
of tolerating any bias introduced by the adversary in the input
stream. By omniscient we mean that the algorithm knows
the number of occurrences of each received element in the
full input stream. We analyze the stationary behavior of this
algorithm through a Markov chains analysis. We then propose
a randomized approximation algorithm, called in the following
the knowledge-free strategy, that is capable of outputting an
unbiased and non static sample of the population whatever the
strategy of the adversary is. This sample may deviate from
an exact uniform sample, however the deviation is bounded
with any tunable probability. This algorithm is a one-pass
algorithm, i.e., each piece of data of the input stream is
scanned sequentially on the fly, and only compact synopses
or sketches that contain the most important information about
data items are locally stored. This algorithm does not require
any a priori knowledge neither on the size of the input stream,
nor on the number of distinct elements that compose it, nor on
the frequency distribution of these elements. We then evaluate
the minimum effort that needs to be exerted by a strong
adversary to bias the output stream when two representative
attacks are launched, i.e., the targeted attacks in which the
adversary focuses on biasing the frequency of a single node
identifier, and the flooding attack which aims at biasing all the
node identifiers frequencies. Both evaluations are conducted by
modeling them as a urn problem. One of the main results of
this analysis is the fact that the effort that needs to be exerted
by the adversary to subvert the sampling service can be made
arbitrarily large by any correct node by just increasing the
memory space of the sampler. Finally, extensive simulations
(both on real data and synthetic traces) confirm the robustness
of our sampler service. To the best of our knowledge, no
previous work has proposed such an analysis.
The outline of this paper is the following. In Section II,
we present related works. Section III describes the model
of the system and the one of the adversary. Section IV
details the properties characterizing the node sampling service,
and presents the omniscient and knowledge-free strategies to
implement such a service. Stationary behavior of the node
sampling service is studied. Section V presents an analysis of
the minimum effort that needs to exerted by the adversary to
subvert the node sampling service. Finally, extended simula-
tions have been conducted in different adversarial contexts and
the main lessons drawn from these simulations are presented
in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. RELATED WORK
Different approaches have been proposed to solve the node
sampling problem in presence of malicious behaviors in large
scale systems. Jesi et al. [14] propose a random sampling
algorithm taking explicitly into account malicious nodes. Their
solution assumes that the ultimate goal of the malicious nodes
is to mutate the random graph into a hub-based graph, hub
for which malicious nodes gain the lead. This approach,
also adopted in several structured based systems [25] through
auditing mechanisms, or in sensor networks [19], is effective
only if the number of malicious nodes is very small with
respect to the size of the system (i.e., typically of O(log n)).
As said in the Introduction, Bortnikov et al. [6] have proposed
a uniform node sampling algorithm that tolerates up to a
linear number of malicious nodes. Their sampling mechanism
exploits the properties offered by min-wise permutations. The
sampling component is fed with the stream of node identifiers
periodically gossiped by nodes, and outputs the node identifier
whose image value under the randomly chosen permutation
is the smallest value ever encountered. Thus eventually, by
the property of min-wise permutation, the sampler converges
towards a random sample. By limiting the number of node
identifiers malicious nodes can periodically issue (no more
than 20% of the total number of requests can be sent
by malicious nodes), their solution requires a single node
identifier to be stored in the local memory. However, once
convergence has been reached, it is stuck to this convergence
value independently from the input values. Thus the sample
does not evolve according to the current composition of the
system.
Streaming algorithms have shown their highly desirable
properties in data intensive monitoring applications. These al-
gorithms process the input stream in a single pass and sequen-
tially. All these algorithms rely on pseudo-random functions
that map elements of the stream to uniformly distributed image
values. The interested reader is invited to read the nice survey
by Muthukrishnan [23]. Most of the research done so far with
this approach has manly focused on computing functions or
statistic measures with error ε using poly(1/ε, log n) space
where n is the domain size of the data items. These include the
computation of the number of different data items in a given
stream [4], [12], [15], the frequency moments [1], the most
frequent data items [1], [8], or the entropy of the stream [7],
[18].
In this work, we go a step further by continuously comput-
ing, in a strong adversarial context, a uniform sample of the
nodes of the system so that for any node identifier present in
the stream, the probability that this node identifier is selected
as a sample is equal to 1/n, and at any time, any node identifier
in the stream has a non null probability to be selected as a
sample.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Model of the Network
We consider a large scale and dynamic open system N in
which each node i ∈ N receives a very large stream σi (or
σ when it is clear from context) made of node identifiers
(also denoted ids in the following). Node identifiers arrive
quickly and sequentially. Each node identifier j of σ is
drawn from a set Ω = {1, . . . , 2r}, where r is chosen to be
large enough to make the probability of identifiers collision
negligible (r = 160 for the standard SHA-1 hash function).
Node identifiers may recur in the stream with an unknown
bias. The number of times a node identifier i recurs in the
stream is commonly called the frequency of i. Data streams
are potentially unbounded in size. For memory constraints,
nodes can locally store only a small amount of information
with respect to the number of nodes in the system. Thus the
stream needs to be processed in an online manner, that is, any
item of the stream that has not been locally stored for any
further processing cannot be read anymore. In addition the
amount of computation per data element of the stream must
be low to keep pace with the data stream.
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B. Adversary
We assume the presence of malicious (i.e., Byzantine) nodes
that collectively try to subvert the system by manipulating
the prescribed protocol. We model these adversarial behaviors
through an adversary that fully controls and manipulates these
malicious nodes. We suppose that the adversary is strong in
the sense that it may actively tamper with the data stream
of any node i by observing, and inserting any number of
malicious nodes identifiers. Indeed, the goal of the adversary
is to judiciously increase the frequency of ℓ chosen node
identifiers to bias the sample built by non malicious nodes.
The number ℓ is chosen by the adversary and depends on the
sampling protocol parameters. Note that each malicious node
identifier does not need to correspond to a single real node.
Indeed, the adversary will augment its power by generating
numerous node identifiers, such that only a limited number of
real malicious nodes are linked to these identifiers. However,
affecting multiple identifiers to a single node is costly as one
needs to interact with a central authority to receive a certificate
assessing the validity and integrity of the identifier. This model
refers to the Sybil model attack presented by Douceur and
Donath [11].
A node present in the system that is not malicious is said to
be correct. Note that correct nodes cannot a priori distinguish
correct node identifiers from malicious ones. Classically, we
assume that the adversary can neither drop a message ex-
changed between two correct nodes nor tamper with its content
without being detected. This is achieved by assuming the
existence of a signature scheme (and the corresponding public-
key infrastructure) ensuring the authenticity and integrity of
messages. This refers to the authenticated Byzantine failure
model [21].We finally suppose that any algorithm run by any
correct node to build a uniform node sampling service is
public knowledge to avoid some kind of security by obscurity.
However the adversary has not access to the local random
coins used in the algorithms.
C. Sampling Assumptions
Similarly to Bortnikov et al. [6], we first assume that there
exists a time T0 such that after that time, the churn of the
system ceases (churn is classically defined as the rate of
turnover of nodes in large scale systems [13]). This assumption
is necessary to make the notion of uniform sample meaningful.
Thus from T0 onwards, the population of the system N is
composed of n ≤ 2r nodes such that ℓ of them are malicious,
with ℓ < n. We also suppose that at any discrete time t ≥ T0
all the correct nodes in N are weakly connected, which means
that there exists a path between any pair of correct nodes in
N . In the following, without loss of generality, we consider
that T0 = 0.
D. 2-universal Hash Functions
In the following, we intensively use hash functions ran-
domly picked from a 2-universal hash family. Given an integer
Y , let us denote [Y ] = {1, . . . , Y } in the remaining of this
paper. A collection H of hash functions h : [M ] → [M ′]
is said to be 2-universal if for every two different items
x, y ∈ [M ],
∀h ∈ H,P{h(x) = h(y)} ≤
1
M ′
,
which is exactly the probability of collision obtained if the
hash function assigned truly random values to any x ∈ [M ].
IV. NODE SAMPLING SERVICE TOLERANT TO MALICIOUS
NODES
A node sampling service tolerant to malicious nodes is
a functionality local to each correct node i of the system1.
This service continuously reads the input stream σi received
by node i. Data streams are made of the nodes identifiers
exchanged within the system. Note that the analysis presented
in this paper is independent from the way data streams are
built. That is, they may result from the continuous propagation
of node ids through gossip-based algorithms, or from the node
ids received during random walks initiated at each node of the
system.
In addition, the input stream of any correct node can
be arbitrarily biased by an adversary, which is achieved by
infinitely often augmenting it with the ℓ ids it manipulates.
The objective of the sampling service strategy is to process on
the fly the input stream and to output a stream guaranteeing
both Uniformity and Freshness. Specifically, if Si(t) denotes
the output of the sampling service at any correct node i at any
discrete time t, then a sampling service tolerant to malicious
behaviors should meet the following two properties.
Property 1 (Uniformity): For any discrete time t ≥ 0, for
any node j ∈ N ,
P{Si(t) = j} =
1
n
Property 2 (Freshness): For any discrete time t ≥ 0, for
any node j ∈ N ,
{t′ > t | Si(t
′) = j} 6= ∅ with probability 1.
Uniformity states that any node in the system should have
the same probability to appear in the sample of correct
nodes in the overlay, while Freshness says that any node that
recurs infinitely often in the stream, should have a non-null
probability to appear infinitely often in the sample of any
correct nodes in the system. It is important to note that even
if the adversary can insert infinitely often the identifiers of the
ℓ nodes it manipulates, by the weak connectivity assumption,
at any discrete time t ≥ 0 there is a non null probability that
the node identifier of any correct node in N appears in the
input stream of any correct node.
1Although malicious nodes have also access to a sampling service, we
cannot impose any assumptions on how they use it as their behavior can be
totally arbitrary.
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Fig. 1. Sampling component of node i ∈ N .
Algorithm 1: Omniscient Node Sampling Strategy run at
any correct node i ∈ N
Input: An arbitrary input stream σi;
Output: A modified output stream σ′i;
Data: Γi a set of maximum size c;
1 for j ∈ σi do
2 if |Γi| < c then
3 Γi ← Γi ∪ {j};
4 else
5 with probability aj do
6 choose k from Γi with probability
rk∑
ℓ∈Γi
rℓ
;
7 Γi ← (Γi \ {k}) ∪ {j};
8 choose k′ from Γi with probability
1
c
;
9 write k′ in the output stream;
A. Omniscient One-pass Strategy
This section presents an omniscient one-pass strategy that
guarantees both the Uniformity and Freshness properties. We
recall that, by one-pass, we mean that the strategy reads
sequentially the input stream and if some node id has not
been locally stored for further processing, once it has been
read it cannot be read anymore. By omniscient, we mean that
the strategy knows exactly the population size n of the system
N and each time a node id j is received in σi, the strategy
knows exactly the occurrence probability pj of j in the full
stream σi. Note however that the omniscient strategy does not
know ahead of time the identifiers that will appear in σi. This
knowledge is built on the fly when reading σi.
The omniscient strategy has uniquely access to a data
structure Γi, referred to as the sampling memory as illustrated
in Figure 1. The cardinality of Γi is constant and is denoted
by c with c≪ n. The sampling memory will contain the node
ids that will be selected by the strategy when reading σi and
that will be output by the sampler. Algorithm 1 describes the
pseudo-code of the omniscient strategy.
Specifically, the omniscient strategy reads on the fly and
sequentially the input stream and for each read element j,
decides whether j is a good candidate for being stored into the
constant size memory Γi or not. If pj is very small, then j must
definitively be stored into Γi so that j might have a chance to
be part of the output stream. On the other hand, with larger pj ,
there will be other opportunities for the sampler to receive j
in the future. The probability to insert j in Γi is denoted by aj
in the algorithm. Although inserting j into Γi with probability
aj is a necessary condition to prevent very frequent ids from
continuously eclipsing the ids already stored in Γi, this is not
sufficient to guarantee that a rare id k already stored in Γi
will not be evicted each time a new id j is stored (assuming
that Γi is full upon receipt of j). Recall that the goal of the
adversary is to prevent identifiers of correct nodes to uniformly
appear in the output stream. A sufficient condition is achieved
by removing k from Γi with probability rk/
∑
ℓ∈Γi
rℓ, where
r1, . . . , rn are positive real numbers. Finally, a random node
id k′ is chosen from Γi and written in the output stream (note
that k′ is not removed from Γi). Clearly, for any node identifier
j ∈ N , aj depends on (pl)l∈N and rj depends on (pl)l∈N and
(al)l∈N .
In the remaining of this section, we prove that there exist
both (aj)j∈N and (rj)j∈N such that the output stream pro-
vided by Algorithm 1 meets the Uniformity and Freshness
properties. Specifically, we show that this is verified for the
following two families
∀j ∈ N , aj =
mini∈N (pi)
pj
and rj =
1
n
.
To prove this assertion, we model the receipt of node ids
from σi by using a homogeneous discrete-time Markov chain
denoted by Xi = {Xi,t, t ≥ 0}. Markov chain Xi represents
the evolution of the node identifiers in Γi. Note that for clarity
reason we shall omit the subscript i when it is clear from
context. The state space S of X is defined by S = {A ⊆
N such that |A| = c}. For any t ≥ 0, the event Xt = A
means that after the t-th transition (i.e., the t-th received node
identifier), Γ = A. The transition probability matrix, denoted
by P , is given for every A,B ∈ S with A 6= B, by
PA,B =


ri∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
pjaj if A \B = {i} and B \A = {j}
0 otherwise
Matrix P being stochastic, we have for every A ∈ S,
PA,A = 1−
∑
B∈S,B 6=A
PA,B
= 1−
∑
i∈A
∑
j /∈A

 ∑
B∈S,A\B={i},B\A={j}
PA,B


= 1−
∑
i∈A
∑
j /∈A
ri∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
pjaj
= 1−
∑
j /∈A
pjaj
= 1−
∑
j∈N
pjaj +
∑
j∈A
pjaj .
It is easily checked that |S| =
(
n
c
)
.
The Markov chain X is clearly irreducible and aperiodic.
It thus have a stationary distribution that we denote by π =
(πA, A ∈ S). The row vector π is thus the unique solution to
the linear system π = πP with π1 = 1, where 1 is the column
vector with all entries equal to 1. The symmetries observed
in the transition probability matrix P gives us the intuition
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that X is reversible, i.e., that, for every A,B ∈ S, we have
πAPA,B = πBPB,A. This intuition is verified by the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: The Markov chain X is reversible and for
every A ∈ S, we have
πA =
1
K
(∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
)(∏
h∈A
phah
rh
)
(1)
where
K =
∑
A∈S
(∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
)(∏
h∈A
phah
rh
)
.
Proof: Consider the vector π = (πA, A ∈ S) defined
by Relation (1) and let A,B ∈ S such that A 6= B. We then
have, by definition of matrix P ,
πAPA,B
=
1
K
(∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
)(∏
h∈A
phah
rh
)
ripjaj∑
ℓ∈A
rℓ
1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
=
1
K
(∏
h∈A
phah
rh
)
ripjaj1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
=
1
K
( ∏
h∈A∩B
phah
rh
)
piai
ri
ripjaj1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
=
1
K
( ∏
h∈A∩B
phah
rh
)
piaipjaj1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
In the same way, exchanging the roles of integers i and j and
of sets A and B, we get
πBPB,A
=
1
K
(∑
ℓ∈B
rℓ
)(∏
h∈B
phah
rh
)
rjpiai∑
ℓ∈B
rℓ
1{B\A={j},A\B={i}}
=
1
K
(∏
h∈B
phah
rh
)
rjpiai1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
=
1
K
( ∏
h∈B∩A
phah
rh
)
pjaj
rj
rjpiai1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}
=
1
K
( ∏
h∈B∩A
phah
rh
)
pjajpiai1{A\B={i},B\A={j}}.
We thus have shown that, for every A,B ∈ S such that A 6= B,
we have πAPA,B = πBPB,A. This implies that X is reversible
and that the probability vector π = (πA, A ∈ S), given by
Relation (1), is the stationary distribution of X .
Let us introduce now, for every ℓ ∈ N , the subset of states
Sℓ defined by
Sℓ = {A ∈ S | ℓ ∈ A}
and consider the probability for X to be in subset Sℓ in
stationary regime. If we denote by γℓ this probability, we have
γℓ =
∑
A∈Sℓ
πA.
Theorem 4: For every ℓ ∈ N , the probability γℓ is
γℓ =
c
n
.
Proof: It is easily checked, as expected, that we have
|Sℓ| =
(
n− 1
c− 1
)
and
n∑
ℓ=1
γℓ = c.
By taking, for every h ∈ N , rh = 1/n and ah = 1/ph ×
mini∈N/(pi), we easily get,
K =
c
n
(
n
c
)
nc
(
min
i∈N
(pi)
)c
and, for every A ∈ S,
πA =
1(
n
c
) ,
which leads, for every ℓ ∈ N , to
γℓ =
∑
A∈Sℓ
πA =
|Sℓ|(
n
c
) = c
n
.
The following corollary summarizes the analysis.
Corollary 5: Algorithm 1 implements a Byzantine-tolerant
node sampling service if
∀j ∈ N , aj =
mini∈N (pi)
pj
and rj =
1
n
.
Proof: Let any correct node i run Algorithm 1. By
assumption, at any discrete time t, every node j in N has
probability pj > 0 to feed Algorithm 1. Thus, aj > 0 for
every j ∈ N . From Theorem 4, when t tends to infinity,
any node j has probability γj = c/n to be in the sampler
memory. From Algorithm 1, the output of the sampler is any
node from Γi chosen with probability 1/c. Thus j appears
as output with probability 1/n, which ensures the Uniformity
property. Similarly, as pjaj > 0, j is guaranteed to appear
in Γi with non null probability. Thus the Freshness property
holds.
B. Knowledge-free One-pass Strategy
We have proposed in Section IV an omniscient sampling
strategy capable of locally unbiasing on the fly any unbounded
and continuous stream σ that may have been arbitrarily ordered
and manipulated by a strong adversary. This strategy uses a
constant amount of memory, and does not need to know ahead
of time which node identifiers will appear in σ. However the
strategy needs to know the size n of N , and upon receipt of
a data item j, its occurrence probability pj in σ. Clearly both
assumptions are unrealistic since the adversary may modify on
the fly the occurrence probability of any node identifier in the
stream by increasing the occurrence frequency of the ℓ node
identifiers it manipulates.
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Algorithm 2: Estimating the Frequency of Items in the
Input Stream (Count-Min Sketch algorithm [9])
Input: An input stream σ; δ and ε settings;
Output: The estimate fˆj for the frequency of any item j read
from the input stream
1 s← ⌈log(1/δ)⌉;
2 k ← ⌈e/ε⌉;
3 Fˆ [1..s][1..k] ← 0;
4 Choose s 2-universal hash functions h1..hs : {1..2
r} → {1..k};
5 for j ∈ σ do
6 for s = 1 to s do
7 Fˆ [s][hs(j)] ← Fˆ [s][hs(j)] + 1;
8 Upon query of Estimate(fj) return
fˆj = min1≤s≤t Fˆ [s][hs(j)];
In this section, we propose a strategy, called hereafter
knowledge-free strategy, that makes no assumption with re-
spect to the input stream σ. For each received j from σ, the
proposed strategy selects the id that will be part of the output
stream by solely relying on an estimation of both n and pj .
Both estimations are computed on the fly by using very few
space and a small number of operations.
Specifically, the knowledge-free strategy uses one additional
data structure with respect to the omniscient one, as illustrated
in Figure 2. This data structure is the Count-Min Sketch matrix
Fˆ proposed by Cormode and Muthukrishnan [9]. Matrix Fˆ
is built on the fly and provides at any time, and for each
j read from σ, an approximation of the number of times j
has appeared in σ from the inception of the stream. For self-
containment reasons, we briefly describe how Fˆ is built.
1) Estimating the frequency of each element in the stream:
For any item j in the input stream σ, the algorithm proposed
by Cormode and Muthukrishnan [9] outputs an estimation fˆj
of the number of times j has occurred in the stream so far. The
error of the estimator in answering a query for fˆj is within a
factor of ε with probability δ. The estimation is computed by
maintaining a two-dimensional array Fˆ of k×s counters with
k = ⌈e/ε⌉ and s = ⌈log2(1/δ)⌉, and by using a collection of
2-universal hash functions {h1, . . . , hs} (where e is the base
of the natural logarithm function ln). Each time an item j is
read from the input stream, this causes one counter per line to
be incremented, i.e., Fˆ [v][hv(j)] is incremented for all v ∈ [s].
When a query is issued to get an estimate fˆj of the frequency
of j (i.e., the number of occurrences of j read so far from
the stream), the returned value corresponds to the minimum
among the s values of Fˆ [v][hv(j)] (1 ≤ v ≤ s). Algorithm 2
presents the pseudo-code of the Count-Min Sketch algorithm.
Space required by Algorithm 2 is proportional to 1ε log2
1
δ ,
and the update time per element is significantly sublinear in
the size of the sketch [9], which makes this algorithm fully
adapted to our context.
2) The knowledge-free strategy: The knowledge-free strat-
egy is a simple extension of the omniscient one, where the
insertion probability aj for any received j ∈ σ is computed by
using the estimation fˆj provided by Algorithm 2. Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3: Knowledge-free Node Sampling Strategy
run at any correct node i ∈ N
Input: An arbitrary input stream σi;
Output: A modified output stream σ′i;
Data: Γi a set of maximum size c;
Data: Fˆ the Count-min Sketch matrix
1 cobegin on σi
2 execute Algorithm 2;
3 cobegin on σi
4 for j ∈ σi do
5 fˆj ← Estimate(fj);
6 minσ ← min1≤s≤tmin1≤r≤k Fˆ [s][r];
7 if |Γi| < c then
8 Γi ← Γi ∪ {j};
9 else
10 with probability aj =
minσ
fˆj
do
11 choose k from Γi with probability rk =
1
c
;
12 Γi ← (Γi \ {k}) ∪ {j};
13 choose k′ from Γi with probability
1
c
;
14 write k′ in the output stream;
presents its pseudo-code. Note that the instructions cobegin
at lines 1 and 3 mean that codes of Algorithm 2 and lines
(4-14) are executed in parallel (at any discrete time t the first
id of σi is read by both codes). We analyze in Section V the
resilience of Algorithm 3 against representative attacks, and
evaluate in Section VI from extensive simulations the quality
of the knowledge-free strategy w.r.t. the omniscient one.
V. THE REASON WHY THE KNOWLEDGE-FREE STRATEGY
IS ROBUST AGAINST COLLUSION OF MALICIOUS NODES
As previously said, we suppose that the adversary has
enough resources to generate a large number of node iden-
tifiers, and to judiciously inject them in the input stream σ
of any correct node, in order to prevent the sampler service
of this node to output a uniform stream. In this section we
derive the minimum number of identifiers the adversary has
to generate to subvert the node sampling service.
We have shown in the previous section that whatever the
power of the adversary, the omniscient strategy is capable
of unbiasing any manipulated input stream. Indeed, we have
shown with Corollary 5 that there exist two positive vectors
(aj)j∈N and (rj)j∈N — respectively describing the insertion
probability of node identifiers j ∈ N in Γ and their removal
one from it —, which guarantee that given the occurrence
probability (pj)j∈N of the node identifiers in the input stream,
the sampler outputs a stream that meets both Uniformity and
Freshness properties. Thus from Algorithm 3, the only latitude
given to the adversary in biasing the output stream of any
correct node is to increase the error made on the estimations
fˆj with j ∈ N . By construction of Algorithm 2, each received
element j is mapped to exactly one entry in each row of matrix
Fˆ , and each of these entries is incremented by one. Thus to
disrupt the estimation of any fˆj , the adversary has to generate
sufficiently many node identifiers o1, . . . , oℓ such that for all
6
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v ∈ [s], there exists i ∈ [ℓ] such that hv(oi) = hv(j). Recall
that the s hash functions are locally chosen, thus the adver-
sary cannot know which identifiers map to h1(j), . . . , hs(j).
By injecting numerous times these node ids o1, . . . , oℓ, the
estimation fˆj will be arbitrarily overestimated, and thus, by
Algorithm 3, j will recur in the output stream with an arbitrary
smaller frequency. We call this attack a targeted attack.
Whereas the goal of the adversary is to bias the frequency
of a single targeted (correct) node identifier (refer as j in the
argumentation above), the knowledge-free strategy forces the
adversary to inject a series of node identifiers o1, . . . , oℓ that
will also bias the frequency estimation of other node identifiers
that are mapped to the same entries (i.e., the ones mapped by
o1, . . . , oℓ). Thus, the adversary will blindly bias the frequency
estimation of several node identifiers, including its owns. In
the worst case, these additional bias inflicted to these other
nodes will be at most as large as the one caused to j. In
Section V-B, we will study the gap that exists between the
effort needed by the adversary to perform a targeted attack and
the one needed to bias all the frequencies estimation (of both
correct and malicious nodes from what has been said above).
We will refer to the latter attack as the flooding attack.
We now analyze the minimum effort that needs to be exerted
by the adversary to make a targeted attack successful with
probability 1− ηT where ηT < 1.
A. Analysis of the effort needed to make a targeted attack
successful
We model a targeted attack as a urn problem, where each
entry of Fˆ is modeled as an urn and each received distinct node
identifier as a ball. Consider a set of k urns initially empty in
which we throw balls, one by one, according to the uniform
distribution (by definition of 2-universal hash functions, each
ball has an equal probability to be thrown in any of the k urns
– cf Section III). We denote by Nℓ the number of non empty
urns at time ℓ, i.e., just after the throwing of the ℓ-th ball
and we consider the integer Lk which counts the number of
balls needed to get a collision with a probability greater than
1−ηT . More formally, for a given value of k and ηT ∈ (0, 1),
we have
Lk = inf{ℓ ≥ 2 | P{Nℓ = Nℓ−1} > 1− ηT }.
In the knowledge-free algorithm, the previous experiment
is executed identically and independently in s sets of k urns.
At each time, we throw in parallel s balls, one in each set
of k urns. For i ∈ [s], the random variable N
(i)
ℓ counts the
number of non empty urns among the i-th set of k urns at
time ℓ and we consider the integer Lk,s which counts the
number of balls needed to get a collision in each set of k
urns, with a probability greater than 1− ηT . We thus have in
particular Lk = Lk,1. More formally, for given values of k, s
and ηT ∈ (0, 1), integer Lk,s is defined by
inf{ℓ ≥ 2 | P{N
(1)
ℓ = N
(1)
ℓ−1, . . . , N
(s)
ℓ = N
(s)
ℓ−1} > 1− ηT }.
Since the s experiments in parallel are identical and indepen-
dent, the random variables N
(1)
ℓ , . . . , N
(s)
ℓ are, for each ℓ ≥ 1,
independent and identically distributed. It is thus sufficient to
consider a single set of k urns and Lk,s is then given by
Lk,s = inf{ℓ ≥ 2 | (P{Nℓ = Nℓ−1})
s
> 1− ηT }. (2)
The random variable Nℓ takes its values in the set {1, . . . , k∧
ℓ}, where k ∧ ℓ denotes the minimum between k and ℓ. The
distribution of Nℓ is given, for every k ≥ 1 and ℓ ≥ 1, by the
following theorem which uses the Stirling numbers S(ℓ, i) of
the second kind. These numbers are defined, for ℓ ≥ 1 and
i = 1, . . . , ℓ, by the relations S(1, 1) = 1 and
S(ℓ, i) = S(ℓ− 1, i− 1)1{i 6=1} + iS(ℓ− 1, i)1{i 6=ℓ}. (3)
It is well-known that this recursion leads to the explicit
formula
S(ℓ, i) =
1
i!
i∑
h=0
(−1)h
(
i
h
)
(i− h)ℓ. (4)
Theorem 6: For every k ≥ 1, ℓ ≥ 1 and i = 1, . . . , k ∧ ℓ,
we have
P{Nℓ = i} =
S(ℓ, i)k!
kℓ(k − i)!
.
Proof: The relation is true for ℓ = 1 since P{N1 = 1} =
1. For ℓ = 2, . . . , k and i = 1, . . . , ℓ, we have
P{Nℓ = i} = P{Nℓ = i | Nℓ−1 = i− 1}P{Nℓ−1 = i− 1}1{i 6=1}
+ P{Nℓ = i | Nℓ−1 = i}P{Nℓ−1 = i}1{i 6=ℓ}
=
k − i+ 1
k
P{Nℓ−1 = i− 1}1{i 6=1}
+
i
k
P{Nℓ−1 = i}1{i 6=ℓ}.
Suppose that the relation is true for integer ℓ−1, i.e., suppose
that for every i = 1, . . . , ℓ− 1, we have
P{Nℓ−1 = i} =
S(ℓ− 1, i)k!
kℓ−1(k − i)!
.
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We then have, for i = 1, . . . , ℓ,
P{Nℓ = i} =
k − i+ 1
k
S(ℓ− 1, i− 1)k!1{i 6=1}
kℓ−1(k − i+ 1)!
+
i
k
S(ℓ− 1, i)k!1{i 6=ℓ}
kℓ−1(k − i)!
=
S(ℓ− 1, i− 1)k!1{i 6=1}
kℓ(k − i)!
+
iS(ℓ− 1, i)k!1{i 6=ℓ}
kℓ(k − i)!
=
[
S(ℓ− 1, i− 1)1{i 6=1} + iS(ℓ− 1, i)1{i 6=ℓ}
]
k!
kℓ(k − i)!
Relation (3) then gives the desired result.
For ℓ > k, the term 1{i 6=ℓ} is equal to 1. Actually, we have
for ℓ > k and i = 1, . . . , k,
P{Nℓ = i} =
k − i+ 1
k
P{Nℓ−1 = i− 1}1{i 6=1}
+
i
k
P{Nℓ−1 = i}.
In the same way, this recursion leads, for i = 1, . . . , k, to
P{Nℓ = i} =
S(ℓ, i)k!
kℓ(k − i)!
,
which completes the proof.
We are now able to compute, for every ℓ ≥ 2, the
probabilities P{Nℓ = Nℓ−1}. We have
P{Nℓ = Nℓ−1} =
k∧(ℓ−1)∑
i=1
P{Nℓ = i | Nℓ−1 = i}P{Nℓ−1 = i}
=
1
k
k∧(ℓ−1)∑
i=1
iP{Nℓ−1 = i}
=
E(Nℓ−1)
k
Figure 3 gives the number of distinct node identifiers Lk,s
(as defined in Relation 2) that the adversary has to inject to
bias the identifier of at least one correct node. Recall that
parameters k and s of Algorithm 2 are common knowledge
(except the random local coins) and thus the adversary is
capable of deriving Lk,s according to the desired probability
ηT . Lk,s is linear in k and sublinear in s and ηT which explains
why attacking a single node requires a significant number of
distinct malicious node identifiers. For instance, when k = 50
and s = 10, the adversary has to inject in the input stream 150
distinct node identifiers to have no more than 50% of chance to
get its targeted attack successful. On the other hand, with the
same settings of k and s, 571 distinct node identifiers need to
be injected to guarantee with probability 0.9999 a successful
targeted attack.
Note that this analysis, as well as the one presented in Sec-
tion V-B, derives the minimum number of distinct identifiers
that need to be injected by the adversary in σ to bias the
output stream. It does not consider the recurrence at which
these identifiers must appear in the input stream σ. As said
in Section III, the effort required by an adversary to bias
the output stream is not in the repeated injection of node
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Fig. 3. Number of distinct malicious node identifiers Lk,s as a function of
the number of columns k and rows s of Matrix Fˆ , and ηT .
identifiers in σ but rather on the cost of creation of these
identifiers. Indeed, to own an identifier, a node typically needs
to interact with a central authority to receive a certificate
assessing the validity and integrity of the identifier. The impact
at which node identifiers recur in the input stream is analyzed
in Section VI.
B. Analysis of the effort needed to make a flooding attack
successful
We now analyze the minimum effort that needs to be exerted
by the adversary to make a flooding attack successful with
probability 1− ηF where ηF < 1. As for the targeted attack,
we model this attack as a urn problem, where as previously,
each entry is modeled as an urn and each received distinct
node identifier as a ball.
Let Uk be the number of balls needed in order to obtain
all the k urns occupied, i.e., with at least one ball. It is easily
checked that P{U1 = 1} = 1 and that, for ℓ ≥ k ≥ 2, we
have
Uk = ℓ =⇒ Nℓ−1 = k − 1.
We thus have
P{Uk = ℓ} = P{Uk = ℓ,Nℓ−1 = k − 1}
= P{Uk = ℓ | Nℓ−1 = k − 1}P{Nℓ−1 = k − 1}
=
1
k
P{Nℓ−1 = k − 1}.
From Theorem 6 and Relation (4), we get, for k ≥ 2 and
ℓ ≥ k,
P{Uk = ℓ} =
S(ℓ− 1, k − 1)(k − 1)!
kℓ−1
=
1
kℓ−1
k−1∑
r=0
(−1)r
(
k − 1
r
)
(k − 1− r)ℓ−1.
Finally, we consider the integer Ek which counts the number
of balls needed to get a collision in all the k × s urns. Note
that this number is independent of s as by definition, the s
experiments in parallel are identical and independent. Thus,
filling entirely a set of k urns leads to obtain all the s sets of
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Settings
ηT or ηF Lk,s Ekk s
10 5
10−1 38 44
(ε ∼ 0.3)
(
δ ∼ 10−2
)
10 5 10−4 104 110
50
5 10−1 193
306
(ε ∼ 0.05)
50
10
10−1 227(
δ ∼ 10−3
)
50
40
10−1 296(
δ ∼ 10−12
)
50 5 10−4 537
65150 10 10−4 571
50 40 10−4 640
250
10 10−1 1,138 1,617
(ε ∼ 0.01)
250 10 10−4 2,871 3,363
TABLE I
KEY VALUES OF Lk,s AND Ek
Parameters ε and δ are respectivelly defined in Algorithm 2 as
precision (t = ⌈log(1/δ)⌉) and error (k = ⌈e/ε⌉).
k urns occupied. For given value of k and ηF ∈ (0, 1), integer
Ek is defined by
Ek = inf
{
ℓ ≥ k
∣∣∣∣∣
ℓ∑
i=k
P{Uk = i} > 1− ηF
}
. (5)
Figure 4 gives the number Ek of distinct ids the adversary
has to inject in the input stream to introduce a bias on the
identifiers of all the correct nodes. This figure actually shows
the upper bound of Lk,s given k and ηT = ηF . Making a
flooding attack successful with probability 0.9 when k = 50
requires around 300 malicious identifiers, while it requires
around 650 node identifiers when the desired probability of
success is equal to 0.9999.
The main results of both analyses are summarized in
Table V-B. The most important one is that the effort that
needs to be exerted by the adversary to subvert the sampling
service can be made arbitrarily large by any correct node
by just increasing the memory space of the sampler. The
second one, which derives from the first one, is the absence
of relationship between the effort of the adversary and the
Data trace # ids (m) # distinct ids (n) max. freq.
NASA 1,891,715 81,983 17,572
ClarkNet 1,673,794 94,787 7,239
Saskatchewan 2,408,625 162,523 52,695
TABLE II
STATISTICS OF REAL DATA TRACES.
size of the population size. This astonishing result definitely
guarantees the scalability of our node sampler service.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE NODE
SAMPLING SERVICE
A. Settings of the Experiments
We have implemented both the omniscient and knowledge-
free strategies of the node sampling service and have con-
ducted a series of experiments on different types of streams
and for different parameters settings. We have fed our algo-
rithm with both real-world data sets and synthetic traces. Real
data give a realistic representation of some existing systems,
while the latter ones allow to capture phenomenon which may
be difficult to obtain from real-world traces, and thus allow to
check the robustness of our strategies. We have varied all the
significant parameters of our algorithm, that is, the size m of
the stream, the number of distinct data items n in each stream,
the size of the local memory c , the number k of entries in
each line of the count-min matrix, and the number s of lines of
this matrix. For each parameters setting, we have conducted
and averaged 100 trials of the same experiment, leading to
a total of more than 100, 000 experiments for the evaluation
of our algorithms. Real data have been downloaded from the
repository of Internet network traffic [3]. We have used three
large traces among the available ones. The first one represents
one month of HTTP requests to the NASA Kennedy Space
Center WWW server, the second one contains two weeks logs
of HTTP requests to the Internet service provider ClarkNet
WWW server (ClarkNet is a full Internet access provider
for the Metro Baltimore-Washington DC area), and the last
one represents seven months of HTTP requests to the WWW
server of the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. These data
sets will be respectively referred to as NASA, ClarkNet, and
Saskatchewan traces in the remaining of the paper. Table II
presents some statistics of these data traces, in term of stream
size (cf. “# ids” in the table), population size in each stream
(cf. “# distinct ids”) and the number of occurrences of the most
frequent id (cf. “max. freq.”). Figure 5 illustrates the shape of
each real data set distribution. Note that all these benchmarks
share a Zipfian behavior, with a lower α parameter for the
University of Saskatchwan.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of our algorithms, we
measure the distance between the output streams and a uniform
one. The distance we use is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) diver-
gence [17], also called the relative entropy, which robustly
measures the statistical difference between two data streams.
Specifically, given v and w two frequency distributions, the
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Kullback-Leibler divergence is then defined as
DKL(v||w) =
∑
i∈N
pi log
vi
wi
= H(v, w)−H(v), (6)
where H(v) = −
∑
vi log vi is the (empirical) entropy of v
and H(v, w) = −
∑
vi logwi is the cross entropy from v to
w. Note that when v = w, the KL divergence is minimal and is
equal to zero. While all the distance measures in the Ali-Silvey
distances are applicable to quantifying statistical differences
between data streams, the KL divergence is particularly suited
to our context since it gives rise to a small number of false
positives when the two data streams are not significantly
different.
B. Main Lessons drawn from the Experiments
We now present the main lessons drawn from these ex-
periments. As said in the previous section, these experiments
aimed at showing the impact of over-represented (malicious)
node identifiers in the input stream of the sampler service.
Figure 6 presents a kind of isopleth in which the horizontal
axis shows time, the vertical axis represents the node iden-
tifiers, and the body of the graph depicts the frequency of
each node identifier (i.e., the number of occurrences of each
node identifier). A lighter color is representative of a very
frequent node identifier. The figure at the top of Figure 6
represents the frequency of each node identifier in the input
stream of the node sampler. This figure shows that at the
inception of the stream, a few number of node identifiers have
been received in the input stream which explains the dark
color on the left. As time elapses, the number of received
identifiers increases (up to 4000), and progressively the bias of
the input stream appears: a small number of identifiers recur
with a high frequency equal to 400, while the frequency of
the other node identifiers sharply decreases. This is represen-
tative to a Poisson distribution with a small index. Now the
two other figures represent the output of the node sampler
run with respectively the knowledge-free strategy and with
the omniscient one. Clearly the omniscient strategy succeeds
in outputting a uniform stream, illustrated by a color that
progressively and uniformly becomes lighter as the number
of received identifiers augments. The knowledge-free strategy
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Fig. 6. Frequency distribution as a function of time.
Settings: m = 40, 000, n = 1000, c = 15, k = 15, s = 17.
is not as performant as the omniscient one, nevertheless it
succeeds in significantly decreasing the peak of high frequency
identifiers with a very small memory (the sampling memory
may contain up to 15 node identifiers, and the Count-Min data
structure Fˆ is a 15 × 14 matrix.) w.r.t. the length m of the
input stream.
Similarly to Figure 6, Figure 7 shows the frequency distri-
bution of node identifiers in respectively the input and output
streams as a function of the node identifiers. Figure 7(a) is
representative of a particular attack, called peak attack in the
following, in which the adversary injects 50, 000 times a single
node identifier while all the other identifiers occur 50 times
in the whole stream. Clearly the omniscient strategy fully
tolerates such an attack by successfully outputting a uniform
and fresh output stream. The knowledge-free strategy allows to
reduce by a factor 50 the frequency peak with a small amount
of memory space (the sampling memory contains 10 entries
and the Count Sketch matrix contains 50 ones) with respect
to the population size n and the length m of the input stream.
Figure 7(b) represents a scenario in which the adversary
has successfully subverted the knowledge-free strategy by
launching both a targeted and flooding attacks. Indeed, in this
figure around 50 node identifiers are over represented in the
input stream σ. Now from Table I, when k = 10, the minimum
number of malicious node identifiers that need to be injected
by the adversary to make a targeted attack successful with
probability 0.9 and 0.9999 is respectively equal to Lk,t = 38
and Lk,t = 104, while it is equal to Ek = 44 and Ek = 110 to
launch a flooding attack. Note that although both attacks are
successful, the sampler service divides by 3 the frequencies of
malicious node identifiers. Note that the omniscient strategy
is fully robust against both attacks.
Figure 8 complements Figure 7(a) by showing the gain GKL
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Fig. 7. Frequency distribution as a function of node identifiers.
Settings: m = 100, 000, n = 1, 000, c = 10, k = 10, s = 5.
of the output stream over the input stream w.r.t. the Kullback-
Leibler divergence. Specifically, let us denote by abuse of
language D(σ,U) (respectively D(σ′,U)) as the Kullback-
Leiber divergence between a given input stream σ (respectively
output stream σ′) and a uniform one U , then
GKL = 1−
D(σ′,U)
D(σ,U)
.
This figure confirms the impressive robustness of the omni-
scient strategy, and shows that the pretty good resilience of the
knowledge-free strategy against a peak attack in a very large
system. Note that the inset graph in Figure 8 simply illustrates
the KL distance between the input and output streams and the
uniform stream.
Figure 9 shows that both output streams (the one constructed
with the omniscient strategy and the knowledge-free one)
reach their stationary regime (i.e., a uniform stream) very
quickly. The first 3, 000 (non necessarily distinct and adversar-
ially ordered) node identifiers are sufficient for the omniscient
strategy to build a definitively unbiased output stream made
of 1, 000 distinct ids, while it takes 3 times more elements
of the input stream for the knowledge-free strategy to reach
this stationary regime. This is still impressive given the very
limited storage space of the latter strategy.
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Figures 10(a) and 10(b) illustrate the intuitive fact that
increasing the number of entries c of sampling memory is
a very powerful defense against respectively peak attacks and
targeted and flooding attacks. In the former case, the peak
attack is completely masked by the knowledge-free strategy
as soon as c = 300, while in the later case, both targeted and
flooding attacks are masked for c = 700 (both with k = 10).
Figure 11 illustrates the gain obtained with the knowledge-
free strategy as a function of the number of malicious node
identifiers overrepresented in the input stream. Obviously, the
strategy becomes vulnerable to malicious nodes once their
number reaches 10% of the full population of the system. This
behavior moves theory into practice according to the result
presented in Table I.
Finally, Figure 12 illustrates the fact running the sampler
service in a real environment still provides very good results.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the node sampling problem in
presence of malicious nodes in a very large system by adopting
a probabilistic approach. We have proposed and analyzed two
online algorithms. The omniscient one is fully resilient to any
attacks launched by a strong adversary, while the knowledge-
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free one is capable of drastically decreasing the impact of
adversarial attacks by using very small memory space.
As future work, we plan to analyze the transient behavior of
the sampling service by using the results on weak lumpability
in Markov chains described in [16] and [24].
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